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Abstract 
 
The concept of collective member of a political party is analysed and a typology is 
established. The West European context is mainly referred to, and the instances of 
collective membership in the main parties of the five “large” countries (France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom) are considered. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Typically the members of a party are natural persons. Nevertheless, there are cases in 
which it is possible that the members are not simple, but multiple: they are collective 
members. 
 
We may consider two sorts of organized groups entitled to participate in the decisions 
of a political party. On the one hand, there are organizations submitted to the statutory 
jurisdiction of the party, even if they have juristic personality. On the other hand, 
collective members come to the fore: exogenous organizations, whose entitlement to 
power in the party qualifies them as members, whether they are dubbed so de iure or 
not. 
 
Normally collective members are organizations having their own legal personality and 
wealth. Concerning the possibility that the members of the collective members may be 
also members of the party, there are three possibilities. Firstly, simultaneous 
membership is excluded. This is typically the case when a regional party has an 
agreement with a national party where the latter accepts a “hands off” clause: the 
national party refrains from setting up its organization (and putting forward candidates 
for elections) in the area covered by the regional party. Automatic transfer of 
membership in case of change of residence may then be part of the agreement. 
Secondly, simultaneous membership is accepted but simultaneous members are a 
minority in the collective member. It happens typically when the two bonds involved 
are of a different nature (e.g., professional and political). Thirdly, simultaneous 
membership is accepted and prevailing (or even automatic). Here the obvious question 
is where the real loyalty lies (e.g. associated parties to the French UMP), especially in 
case of conflict. 
 
The concept of “collective member” of a party can be considered from a juridical or a 
political viewpoint. The former meaning can be made precise in every legal system, if 
thus intended; the latter one may have blurred contours. The legal system of the 
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country, the statutes (constitution and rules) of the party and the political customs and 
practice, delimit the rights and duties of members towards the juristic person that the 
party is. Even for natural persons, the statutes of the party may consider different 
categories of agents (e.g. in the currently two main Italian political parties: the Partito 
Democratico speaks of “iscritti” and “elettori”1 and the Popolo della Libertà of 
“aderenti” and “associati”), and which are the real “members” is then a subject for 
further analysis.  
 
In this paper we study the concept of collective member of a political party and try to 
establish a typology. Examples and counterexamples are considered for every main 
concept, although in politics the borders are sometimes blurred. We refer mainly to a 
West European context: all the instances of collective membership in the main parties of 
the five “large” countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom) are 
considered. In Sections 2 and 3 the issues of membership and articulation of a party are 
addressed. Section 4 deals with a proposed typology. 
 
2. Membership 
 
The concept of membership concerns the relation between members and some group 
they belong to. This relation is the result of a contract (usually an adhesion contract) 
between every member and the group. This contract is to be within the law, the 
constitution of the party and political customs.  
 
When there is a contract between an organized group and a political party, one may ask 
whether this contract makes the group a collective member. The question is whether the 
contract makes the group, as such, a member of the party. Among all the agents related 
to a political party, its members are characterized as having the ultimate decision power 
in the party. This is especially the case for the constitutional (or statutory) decisions. 
 
As defined above, a collective member of a political party is an organization exogenous 
to the party whose entitlement to power in the party qualifies it as member. Both the 
organization and the collective member are juristic persons, and thus all their decisions 
are made by their respective organs (in the case of decisions taken by direct ballot, the 
set of all members constitute an organ). The participation in power of the collective 
member in the political party can be exerted by its leadership or directly by the 
members of the collective member (in the latter case, a weighting may be given to the 
vote of the members of the collective member if also the personal members of the party 
are balloted).  
 
When the participation of an organized group in the power of a political party is mainly 
exerted directly by the members of the group, the question arises whether the group as 
such is a collective member, or rather the members of the group are directly members of 
the party. This kind of question was already posed by Duverger (1958): “In the direct 
party the members themselves form the party community without the help of other 
social groupings […] The indirect party is made up of the union of the component social 
groups (professional or otherwise) […] On the other hand the idea of “indirect party” 
                                                 
1 In Article 2.1 of the Statute of the Partito Democratico can be read: “For the purposes of this Statute, 
two agents of the internal democratic life are identified: iscritti and elettori”. (“Ai fini del presente 
Statuto, vengono identificati due soggetti della vita democratica interna: gli iscritti e gli elettori”). 
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supposes that there is no party community really distinct from the component social 
groups”2. In fact, the answer to the question whether either the organized group or its 
members are members of the party, depends on how far the members of the group, 
when they participate directly in the decisions of the party, keep the decisional structure 
of the group. 
 
An organized group is more than the sum of its members. Among them there are 
relations providing the group with a structure. Thus, as far as decision making is 
concerned, we can speak of the decisional structure of the group. It comprises the 
organization of the group, but also a feeling of belonging3 and norms (formal or 
informal) of behaviour. The decisional structure of a collective member of a political 
party is in principle affected by the fact that the collective member appertains to the 
party. On the other hand, it is through its decisional structure that the collective member 
(and thus its members, if this is the case) participates in the decisions of the party. 
 
Who determines the framework for the relations among the collective members and the 
party? Certainly, there will be always bargaining and handling among the actors, but, in 
the end, who is to decide the rights of the collective members, and their weights in the 
organs of power? 
 
There is a current party constitution and there are unwritten rules; usually a considerable 
inertia to alter the so established balance of power applies. At any rate, the contract 
between collective member and political party can be discontinued (whether this can be 
a unilateral decision depends on the law of the country), and then the collective member 
finishes being so. If an organization joins the party as collective member, then all 
members of the organization receive rights in the party. These rights in the party come 
automatically with membership of the organization. The party has no control on this 
sort of “indirect membership”. Certainly, an organization can be expelled from the 
party, if its character becomes unacceptable to the party4. A different question, as 
mentioned above, is whether members of the collective member can also be members of 
the party. 
 
Sometimes the contract between collective member and party is a sort of adhesion 
contract, and the power share of the collective member, and the ways to exert it, are to 
be determined by the organs of the party (in which certainly the collective member may 
have a decisive weight); such is the case of the membership of the trade unions in the 
British Labour Party. Alternatively, it can be that the rules determining the power 
relations between collective member and party are set in the clauses of a pact between 
equals, and whose terms are bound to continue except for mutual agreement. In such a 
                                                 
2 “Dans le parti direct, les adhérents forment eux-mêmes la communauté partisane, sans le relai d’autres 
groupes sociaux […] Le parti indirect est constitué par l’union de groupes sociaux de base (professionnels 
ou autres) […] La notion de “parti indirect” suppose au contraire qu’il n’y a pas de communauté partisane 
réellement distincte des groupes sociaux de base”. 
3 It depends on the kind of party how strong is this feeling, being more, or less, near to the psychological 
sense of community as defined by Sarason (1974): “The perception of similarity to others, an 
acknowledged interdependence with others, a willingness to maintain this interdependence by giving to or 
doing for others what one expects from them, and the feeling that one is part of a larger dependable and 
stable structure”. 
4 The British Labour Party has tried always to maintain its democratic purity by having repeatedly 
expelled organizations with communist leanings. The trade unions, so determinant in the party, were 
historically instrumental in this sense. 
4 
 
case, the party has no possibility to alter these rules on its own accord, and they tend to 
be rigid. There is no organ in the party able to adapt the rules of the game to changing 
circumstances. If the maintenance of the relation between collective member and party 
is politically “unavoidable”, the circumstances that led to the original constitutional 
pact, perhaps exceptional or contingent, remain frozen, exerting a strong influence on 
the future (a case of path dependence, v. Pierson (2004)). 
 
3. Articulation 
 
Characteristic of the organization of a political party, as of that of many groups, is 
articulation: in the structure of the party there are intermediate groups that articulate it. 
In this way the members of the party have a multiple membership: of the party as such 
and of one or more intermediate groups. These groups are endogenous, i.e. submitted to 
the statutory jurisdiction of the party. 
 
An articulation of a party starts from a division of the population of the country which 
partitions it. By creating a system of endogenous groups this division is integrated in the 
organizational structure of the party so as to make the organization come closer to the 
individual member. As it results from a partition, each member of the party belongs, at 
least ideally, to one and only one of the groups constituting the articulation, which thus 
covers the whole party. The party can dispose, of course, of specialized organizations 
(for the young, for women, for the old…), improving the insertion of groups with 
special interests and serving as channels for better perceiving their demands. But in an 
articulation, in contrast with target groups, there is an essential equality of all 
components; there is no attempt to intensify the mediation efforts with a particular 
section of the community. An articulation has fundamentally both a universal and a 
symmetric character. 
 
Typically the territorial partition provides the basic articulation of the party5: the 
intermediate groups correspond to geographical areas; normally there are several levels 
of articulation: local, regional… (often one of these levels is decisive, and the 
corresponding divisions have even juristic personality). But the territorial network is 
normally the only one reaching all individual members (i.e., it is exhaustive) and that 
which fundamentally interconnects the party and relates the members with the central 
organs. However, there may be cases in which there is also a parallel non-territorial 
articulation. 
 
What other partition criteria, as alternatives to the territorial principle, strong enough as 
to be able to provide a universal articulation, could be put forward? The professional 
activity is a natural candidate, but to be a feasible option at least two conditions should 
be satisfied: (1) the party has an appreciable enough inter-class component; (2) there are 
(or there used to be) forces of loyalty to the party (cleavages or other) able to check the 
                                                 
5 The German law on political parties has an article on “articulation” (“Gliederung”), where it reads: “The 
parties are articulated in area associations. The size and boundaries of the associations are established by 
the statute. The area articulation must be unfolded so far as to make possible to the individual members an 
appropriate contribution to the formation of the will of the party“. (“Die Parteien gliedern sich in 
Gebietsverbände. Gröβe und Umfang der Gebietsverbände werden durch die Satzung festgelegt. Die 
gebietliche gliederung muss so weit ausgebaut sein, dass den einzelnen Mitgliedern eine angemessene 
Mitwirkung an der Willensbildung der Partei möglich ist”). 
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hefty internal tensions arising from an articulation in groups representing substantially 
different economic interests. 
 
Duverger (1958) defines the centralization and decentralization of the party as the way 
in which power is distributed amongst the different levels of leadership. Among the 
general types of decentralization, he considers social decentralization, which “consists 
in organizing into an autonomous group, inside the party, each economic class: middle-
class, agriculturists, salaried workers, etc., and in giving important powers to these 
corporative branches”6. 
 
It is possible that the party refrains from integrating in its organization one of the 
sections of the partition of the population (e.g. a region in a territorial partition), perhaps 
forced by circumstances. If this section is taken up by some other party, there can be an 
agreement between this (small) party and the large party active in the other sections. 
This agreement may be of a coalitional kind, or rather involve the small party becoming 
a collective member of the large party: in both cases the small party completes the 
articulation of the large one. The latter more intimate sort of agreement is more likely if 
the partition follows a territorial pattern than if it follows e.g. a professional one. 
 
The Austrian Popular Party (“ÖVP”) has a double articulation: territorial 
(“Landesparteien”) and sectorial, through interest sectors (“Teilorganisationen”). It is an 
archetypal case where the exclusivity of the territorial articulation does not hold. Both 
territorial and sector organizations have juristic personality. There are as many 
territorial parties as regions, and six sector organizations: for blue-collar and white-
collar workers (“ÖAAB”), farmers (“ÖBB”), business people (“ÖWB”), women 
(“ÖFB”), young people (“JVP”) and senior citizens (“ÖSB”). Even if it is possible to be 
a member of the ÖVP without being also member of one of the sector organizations, 
this is in practice rare7. The three latter sector organizations have correlatives in many 
other parties, and respond to the idea of “natural groupings” for collectives supposed to 
need their own channels of representation and whose defence of interests is not 
considered particularly “divisive”. In contrast, the three former ones (ÖAAB, ÖBB and 
ÖWB) are supposed to represent all occupational sectors, to which are (were or are to 
be) bound, directly or indirectly, all citizens: they constitute a further articulation of the 
party, parallel to the territorial one. In fact, there are informal criteria for the sharing out 
of power among the three professional organizations. In this sense Müller (2006) writes: 
“When the composition of some body of the party is not to be decided through 
delegation of the professional organizations, but through election, there is an implicit 
apportionment (“Proporz”) among them, which today reaches still up to the leading 
bodies of the party, and earlier even included the top positions (leader of the party, 
general secretary, leader of the parliamentary group)” 8. 
 
                                                 
6 “La décentralisation sociale … consiste à organiser de façon autonome, au sein du parti, chaque 
catégorie économique: classes moyennes, agriculteurs, salariés, etc., et à donner des pouvoirs importants 
à ces sections corporatives”. 
7 The admissions to party and sector organization are decided independently, although the application 
form is unified. The expulsion of the party is a joint decision of party and sector organization. 
8 “Dort wo nicht bündische Delegation, sondern ein Wahlakt über die Zusammensetzung von 
Parteigremien entscheidet, gibt es einen impliziten Bündeproporz, der heute noch bis in die 
Führungsgremien der Partei reicht und früher selbst die Spitzenpositionen (Parteiobmann, 
Generalsekretär, Klubobmann) einschloss”. 
6 
 
Certainly the fact that ÖAAB, ÖBB and ÖWB represent all occupational sectors does 
not mean that the membership of the ÖVP is a mirror image of Austrian society. No 
political party is, and so the French Socialist Party is said to be a party of teachers and 
academics in state education, not without a reason. Farmers, public servants (the 
common Austrian sees the ÖAAB as dominated by the public servants) and business 
people are over-represented in the ÖVP. In the case of the ÖVP these numerical 
predominances have reached some crystallization through the professional 
organizations. 
 
In the German (Bavarian) CSU there are also organizations (“Arbeitsgemeinschaften”) 
for employees, business people and farmers (art. 27 of the Statute). However this 
panoply of organizations is not intended to articulate the party, but to look after specific 
groups, targeting the message of the party and channelling impulses and suggestions. 
The same can be said of the CDU, where there are organizations (“Vereinigungen”) for 
employees and business people (art. 38 of the Statute)9. 
 
There is arguably some parallelism between the Gaullist “union” or “rassemblement” 
and the German “Union”. In the words of Schmid (1990), “the CDU has considered 
itself since its foundation above all as “union” and “popular party”, i.e. as an institution 
spreading beyond the old “Zentrum” party and a meeting-place of different interests, 
classes and denominations”10. Nevertheless, both in the case of CDU and CSU the 
occupational organizations are far from being structurally decisive. In that respect, 
Mintzel (1978) says: “The formal criterion of the existence in the Statute of special 
organizations and sub-organizations within the party or linked to the party cannot be 
used as a sign of the real existence of a “popular party” [“Volkspartei”]. In this sense 
the “Arbeitsgemeinschaften“ cannot be considered an essential structural element of the 
CSU”11. 
 
4. A typology 
 
We consider three sorts of collective members, in accordance with whether the 
collective member is itself a political party, and with its embedding in the “large” 
political party: 
 
1. The collective member is a political party and completes the articulation of the 
large political party. 
                                                 
9 At any rate, to articulate a political party on the basis of certain social dividing lines could be suicidal. 
The lines among religious denominations are a good example in the German Christian-democratic family. 
No less a person than Karl Bath resisted the idea of the interdenominational (but Catholic-dominated) 
CDU: “…If we were to cooperate with them, we should always be at a disadvantage –whereas we would 
seek to be guided by the Word of God in practical political questions, the Catholics would make their 
decisions on the basis of natural law and would take us for a ride before we had reached a conclusion in 
our deliberations” (quoted in Pridham (1977)). 
10 “Die CDU versteht sich seit ihrer Gründung vor allem als “Union” und “Volkspartei”, d.h. als eine das 
alte Zentrum übergreifende Einrichtung und Sammelbecken unterschiedlicher Interessen, Schichten und 
Konfessionen”. 
11 “Das formal-statutarische Kriterium der Existenz innerparteilicher oder parteiverbundener 
Sonderorganisationen bzw. Suborganisationen kann nicht als Indicador für die reale Existenz einer 
“Volkspartei” verwendet werden. Ebensowenig kann in den Arbeitsgemeinschaften ein wesentliches 
Strukturelement del CSU gesehen werden”. 
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2. The collective member is a political party and does not play a role in the 
articulation of the large political party. 
3. The collective member is not a political party. 
 
Thus the typology is provided by two dichotomous dimensions: the character (political 
or non-political) of the collective member, and the embedding (articulating or non-
articulating) of the collective member in the political party. 
 
 
 Embedding (articulating→non-articulating) 
Political, articulating Political, non-articulating Character 
(political→non-political)  Non-political, non-articulating 
 
 
 
4.1. Articulating agreement between political parties 
 
We have seen above how a “small” political party can complete the articulation of a 
“large” party by becoming a collective member of the large one. 
 
The laws on political parties of Germany, Austria and Spain impose that members of 
parties should be exclusively natural persons. Indeed, in the German and Austrian case 
collective members, as defined above, do not exist in political parties. However, in the 
Spanish case the complex relation between PSOE (“Partido Socialista Obrero Español”) 
and PSC-PSOE12 (the Catalan socialists), a most important fact of Spanish politics, may 
be considered as the PCS being a collective member of the PSOE. 
 
Firstly, the PSC is an organization exogenous to the PSOE. Apart from some 
(substantial) mutually agreed connections, the PSC is a fully sovereign political party. 
In particular, the establishment and maintenance of the agreement between PSC and 
PSOE is a decision of both of them. The PSC could break the “contract” without 
altering its structure. The fact that almost certainly this would mean a split in the PSC 
lies in the sphere of political consequences of political decisions. 
 
Secondly, the entitlement to power of the PSC in the PSOE qualifies the former as a 
collective member of the latter. 
 
In the PSOE the “Federal Congress” (“Congreso Federal”) is the source of all power. In 
the Federal Congress, held every three years (if not convened for a special meeting), the 
main organs of the party are elected: the “Federal Committee” (“Comité Federal”), the 
“Federal Executive Commission” (“Comisión Ejecutiva Federal”) and the General 
Secretary. In fact, the Federal Congress, far from being an acclaiming body of the 
decisions of the Executive Commission, has been historically the organ where the 
course of the party has been set. 
 
In the words of Verge and Barberá (2009), “the relation between PSOE and PSC has 
been characterized by a considerable ambiguity”13. This relation is governed by the 
                                                 
12 We shall shorten “PSC-PSOE” to “PSC” in the sequel. 
13 “La relación entre el PSOE y el PSC se ha caracterizado por una notable ambigüedad”. 
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“Protocol” (1978), a document agreed on the occasion of the merger of the Catalan 
branch of the PSOE and two Catalan socialist parties of the time (PSC-C and PSC-R) to 
create the PSC-PSOE14. In this agreement the direct participation of the members of the 
PSC in the Federal Congress through delegates elected in the same way as those of the 
PSOE was established (thereby through the local branches, and in practice the 
decisional structure of the PSC is kept), as well as a representation of the PSC 
(proportional to the number of its members) in the Federal Committee and a 
participation in the Executive Commission. After the Federal Congress elects the 
General Secretary, (s)he proposes to the Congress the members of the new Executive 
Commission. According to the Protocol, the representatives of the PSC in the Executive 
Commission will be “proposed or endorsed where appropriate” by the PSC delegates in 
the Congress. Needless to say, this splendidly ambiguous wording has led usually to last 
minute bargaining between the just elected General Secretary and the leaders of the 
Catalan delegates in the Congress. Roller and van Houten (2003) speak of “the PSC-
PSOE’s dual nature as a regional party and an affiliate of a national party”. 
 
Initially PSOE and PSC formed separated parliamentary groups in the lower house of 
the Spanish parliament (“Congreso de los Diputados”), although “under common 
discipline of speech, action and vote”, the decisions being made after deliberation in 
common assembly and joint meeting of both permanent committees. Eventually a 
common parliamentary group was constituted, in whose executive organs the presence 
of PCS parliamentarians has been always above their proportion in the whole group; the 
vote discipline has been very strict (Colomé 2003). As in the Spanish Constitution the 
President of the Government is elected by the lower house of Parliament, and besides 
the upper chamber (“Senado”) has an ancillary role in the legislative procedure, the 
common action of PSOE and PSC in the “Congreso de los Diputados” brings about a 
common action in national politics. In fact, ordinary Spaniards perceive both entities as 
“the same thing”, at least at the national level15. 
 
In the British Conservative Party, there is a relation with its Scottish organization that 
could seem similar to that between PSOE and PSC. In its Constitution16, the party 
considers as members not only the individual members (classified into “party members” 
and “Scottish party members”), but also the constituency associations and the “Scottish 
Conservative and Unionist Party” as such. In fact, the constituency associations are 
submitted to the party and provide its articulation. The Scottish party members 
participate like the other members in the election of the key organs of the party17. 
 
The Constitution of the Conservative Party (Schedule 9) reads: “Scottish Party 
Members are bound by the provisions of the Constitution of the Scottish Conservative 
and Unionist Party (“SCUP”). Notwithstanding any other provision contained within 
                                                 
14 The possibility of this particular relation is recognized in the additional provision 1 of the Statute of the 
PSOE. About the Protocol, Hopkin (2009) says that “a confederal agreement was established in 1978 on 
the basis of a “unity protocol” which created a delicate compromise between socialist unity and Catalan 
distinctiveness. The new party – the PSC-PSOE – was a sovereign organization, but one that would 
participate in the statewide socialist project”. 
15 Certainly the alleged dismembering character of the current PSOE-PSC scheme is becoming a salient 
issue among ordinary Spaniards. 
16 In contrast with its country, the British Conservative Party has a written constitution since the internal 
reorganization pushed forward by William Hague in 1998. 
17 Certainly the Scottish influence is limited by the fact that the weight of MPs is important in many 
decisions processes of the party, and Scotland hardly returns any Tory representative to Westminster. 
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this Constitution, the SCUP and Scottish Party Members shall therefore have only the 
following rights and obligations with respect to the Party within this Constitution… ”. 
In practice, the Scottish party cannot be considered a fully sovereign organization. 
There are two substantial differences between the Scottish Conservative Party and the 
Catalan PSC. Firstly, the “constitutional power” lies in the (central) Conservative Party, 
to which corresponds to delimit the relation between the Scottish section and the global 
party. In contrast, the relation between PSOE and PSC is determined by a bilateral 
agreement and the subsequent customs developing it, and the PSOE cannot alter it 
unilaterally. Secondly, the constituency associations in Scotland belong to the (global) 
party as such associations (although their members are “Scottish members”), and thus 
the supervision in the selection of candidates to the Parliament in Westminster 
corresponds to the global party. All in all, the Scottish Conservative Party can rather be 
considered an organization within the articulation of the global Conservative Party than 
a collective member as defined above. 
 
Certainly the Scottish branch is not symmetric with the other territorial components of 
the British Conservative Party (as it is also the case with the PSC respect to the PSOE). 
“Symmetry” refers here to the quality that all party members, irrespective of the 
component they belong to, have the same rights and obligations concerning the central 
party and, in particular, have the same spheres of influence in making the common 
decisions. Typically, there can be an asymmetry when the border between central 
competences and territorial competences (i.e. those of the centre and those of the 
components) varies according to the territorial component. For example, the central 
organization of the party may have decision power in some matters of regional policy, 
whose effects go beyond the concrete region, in certain territorial components, but not 
in others. This asymmetry, if within bounds, does not impinge on the structure of 
membership, but on the relations between the centre and territorial components18. 
 
4.2. Non-articulating agreement between political parties 
 
Article 3 of the Statute of the French UMP (“Union pour un Mouvement Populaire”) 
contemplates the possibility that legal persons (political parties or not) are associated to 
the party. There is a line in French political thought, certainly shared by de Gaulle, 
according to which political parties are divisive, and thus terms like “rassemblement” or 
“union”, implying a capacity to joint different visions and parties, are to be preferred. 
 
Admittedly, the Gaullism in the UMP is rather washed-out. Bréchon (2004) refers to the 
UMP as “a large party of the right in which the Gaullism, gradually emptied of its 
original substance, has dissolved”19. At any rate, the idea of “iunge et imperas” lies in 
the very birth of the UMP; in the words of Haegel (2007): “Officially created during the 
foundation congress of 17 November 2002, the “Union for a Popular Movement” 
(UMP) had to make an end of the plurality of organizations of the French right by 
bringing together its diverse components in a large party […] The curve of unification 
                                                 
18 On the other hand, even if there is symmetry in competences, it is possible that members have a 
different weight in the decisions of the centre according to the component they belong to. These 
differences in weight may affect only particular sorts of decisions. In fact, questions of regional balance 
allow often the members of some territorial component to have over-proportional representation in the 
organs of the party (as it is often the case with regions in the institutions of the state). 
19 “un grand parti de droite dans lequel le gaullisme, progressivement vide de sa substance originelle, 
s’est dissous”. 
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has been taken and […] the stake that represents the expression of the diversity of the 
French right wing currents is found henceforth essentially imported to the interior of the 
UMP”20. Among the political parties associated to the UMP are the Christian-
Democratic Party (“Parti Chrétien-Démocrate”) and the Radical Party (“Parti Radical”); 
curiously enough, they represent the confessional party and the “laïque” party par 
excellence in France. 
 
The relation between an associated legal person and the UMP is governed by the 
association agreement, a “contrat de droit privé” according to the French Law of 
Associations of 1901. It is usual to keep most clauses confidential. The agreement 
between associated parties and UMP usually stipulates that the joint candidate to the 
presidential election is to be chosen by the UMP. Also the parliamentarians elected to 
the National Assembly typically integrate into the common parliamentary group. As for 
the meaning of this to guarantee common political action, the personalized character of 
French politics21 and the fluidity of its party landscape are to be taken into account. 
Typically the members of the associated legal person become members of the UMP if 
they wish, a representation in the National Council of the UMP is agreed (under the 
conditions fixed by the Political Bureau of the UMP), and a subsidy is paid by the UMP 
to the associated legal person. 
 
For any agreement between political parties, articulating or not-articulating, the question 
arises whether one of the parties becomes a collective member of the other, or there is 
merely a coalition between them. 
 
In a coalition none of the parties receives an entitlement to decision power in the 
organizations of the other parties. Here it is necessary to distinguish between the 
decisions taken by the organization of the party and those made by their members in the 
institutions of the state. Sometimes this distinction is not easy, and this is particularly 
the case with parliamentary groups. In the British tradition, parliamentary groups are 
part or the organization of the parties and relevant in their internal decisions22. In 
continental political parties, parliamentary groups are not in general part of their 
organization, although they are arguably part of their decision structure. Then it may be 
that the parties in a coalition join in a single parliamentary group. This is the case of 
CDU and CSU in the German Bundestag. In general, it is difficult to say how far the 
party allegiances of the members of such mixed parliamentary groups shape the political 
alignments in the discussions and how a common position is reached, both within the 
members of each party and in the whole group, either by majority voting or negotiation. 
As for the CDU and the CSU in the Bundestag, there is one organized subgroup for 
each party. The current accord between the parties lays down: “Fundamental political 
                                                 
20 “Officiellement créée lors du congrès fondateur du 17 novembre 2002, l’Union pour un mouvement 
populaire (UMP) devait mettre fin à la pluralité des organisations de la droite française en rassemblant ses 
diverses composantes dans un grand parti […] Le tournant de l’unification a été pris et […] l’enjeu que 
représente l’expression de la diversité des droites françaises se trouve désormais, et pour l’essentiel, 
importé à l’intérieur de l’UMP”. 
21 Who is the incumbent President of the Republic, and whether s(he) belongs to the UMP, is an 
important consideration. 
22 V. in this regard McKenzie (1963), where it can be read that “whatever the rôle granted in theory to the 
extra-parliamentary wings of the parties, in practice final authority rests in both parties [Labour and 
Conservative] with the parliamentary party and its leadership. In this fundamental respect the distribution 
of power within the two major parties is the same”. 
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decisions of the parliamentary group CDU/CSU are to be taken only in agreement 
between both subgroups”23. 
 
4.3. Agreement between two sorts 
 
The British Labour Party admits in its structure not only individual members, but also 
“affiliated organisations”, among which the trade unions play a very important role in 
the life and governance of the party. Half of the total voting entitlement in the Party 
Conference corresponds to the affiliated organisations (in practice, mostly the trade 
unions), and half of the elective members of the NEC (“National Executive Committee) 
are appointed by the trade unions. In the election of the party leader, the same voting 
entitlement (one third each) is apportioned to the affiliated organisations, to individual 
members, and to members of the Commons and the European Parliament. The election 
procedure to elect their delegates in the Party Conference is up to every union (these 
delegates choose in turn the representatives in the NEC), whereas for the election of 
leader of the party it is laid down that all union members paying the “political levy” 
should participate on a one-person-one-vote basis. 
 
The members of the affiliated trade unions can opt out of paying the political levy, in 
whose case they have no right to vote in the decisions of their union as affiliated 
organisation of the party. But this “opting out” must be explicit. On the contrary, 
between 1927 and 1946 the acceptance to pay had to be explicit (otherwise the political 
levy was not exacted), and the result was a marked fall in the number of trade unionists 
paying the political levy. 
 
When collective members are not political parties, they normally represent interest 
groups. Thus rival parties may claim to defend the national interest and not that of a 
particular group. In a time of falling partisanship (v. e.g. Dalton and Wattenberg 
(2009)), parties trying to represent a particular section of society risk missing decisive 
electoral targets. Certainly it has been affirmed that historically the trade unions have 
been moderate in applying their clout in the Labour Party: “Restraint has been the 
central characteristic of the trade union-Labour Party relationship”24. At any rate, after 
the “winter of discontent” in 1978-79, the prevailing perception among the British 
electorate was that the Labour Party was too dependent on the unions, and besides that 
the interests of the unions did not coincide in several substantial issues with the national 
interest. A succession of electoral defeats (until the “New Labour” victory of 1997) 
prompted the party to reduce gradually the power of the unions qua unions in its 
organization. Quinn (2004) comments on the process: “Everyone in the Labour Party 
wants to win elections but they sometimes differ over how to do so. It is those that value 
office-seeking above else who gain the upper hand inside a party the longer it is in 
opposition. An unsuccessful party is like a plummeting hot-air balloon: if initial 
attempts to regain height are unsuccessful, items must be thrown overboard until the fall 
is halted and height regained. The longer a party is out of office, more policies must be 
changed; organisational change is often a prerequisite for policy change, as the power-
bases of those groups that cling to the old policies are undermined”. 
 
                                                 
23 “Grundsätzliche politische Entscheidungen der CDU/CSU-Fraktion erfolgen nur im Einvernehmen 
zwischen beiden Gruppen”. 
24 V. Minkin (1992). 
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The trade unions, not being political parties, are clearly (even archetypically) collective 
members of the British Labour Party. This is not the case of the three professional 
organizations, ÖAAB, ÖBB and ÖWB, articulating the Austrian ÖVP, as seen above. 
 
Article 9.1 of the Organisation Statute of the ÖVP reads: “The sector organizations 
must work together when they carry out the federal election issues, campaigns and 
contests. The guidelines and task assignments provided for this purpose by the federal 
party are compulsory”. This normative insistence, appearing in other places of the 
Organisation Statute, responds to what historically has been a succession of conflicts 
and coordination problems. When Alois Mock was elected President of the party in 
1979, he set himself as one of his main goals to establish clearly the preponderance of 
the federal party on the professional organizations. Although something has been done 
since then in this direction, the ÖAAB, ÖBB and ÖWB are still a key factor in the 
dynamic (and the static) of the party25.  
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